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Summary
A two-day joint US-NZ Workshop on Critical Infrastructure Systems was held in Taupo 10-11th
August 2005.  The workshop was organised under the joint sponsorship of the US National
Science Foundation (NSF) and the NZ Ministry for Research Science and Technology (MoRST).
Organisation of the workshop was co-ordinated by the Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAE),
overseen by two co-chairs for the Workshop; Professor John Mander of University of Canterbury
and Professor Anne Kiremidjian of Stanford University.
The goal of the workshop was to provide an expert forum to examine the linkages and failure
implications between infrastructure vulnerability, economic consequences and human social
impacts.  Workshop papers examined the current ‘state-of-the-art’ with discussion focused on
identifying knowledge gaps and the implications for future research and professional practise.
The workshop followed a CAE organised two day international conference on Resilient Infra-
structure held in Rotorua 8-9th August 2005.  Whilst not all of the workshop participants from
New Zealand attended the conference, the majority did so, as did the entire overseas contin-
gent to the workshop.  The conference was well attended, had a strong international contribu-
tion and the presentations given had an important impact on the thinking of the people in the
workshop.  Workshop participants totalled 26 consisting of seven people from the USA, two
people from Europe, one guest from Australia and sixteen persons from New Zealand.  The
delegates represented a wide cross-section of interests from the engineering profession, academia
and government.
This report outlines the background to the Workshop and presents a summary of the discus-
sion highlights.  The workshop was a very successful meeting.  Twelve high-quality presenta-
tions were made on the performance and assessment of critical infrastructure systems.  As well,
useful exchanges of views and experiences took place during lively break-out and question-
and-answer sessions.
The workshop resolved to prepare a monograph on ‘Assessing Critical Infrastructure Systems’
to be prepared for publication by CAE and with contributions to be provided by workshop
participants.  It was also resolved that a follow-up workshop be held in the near future, and
that the possibility of meeting at about the same time, or during, the 100th Anniversary Confer-
ence of the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake be explored (April 2006).
A small group of key people has been convened to define the process and keep it alive.  It is
expected that this initiative will be developed as a cross-disciplinary effort focused on on-
going collaboration to better define and co-ordinate our understanding of the rules and princi-
ples which govern system interdependence and networks inter-operability.
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1 Outline of the Issues
Infrastructure is the linked system of networks and facilities that provide the range of essential
services that are generally necessary to support a nation’s economy and quality of life. Infra-
structure represents a massive capital investment and is of enormous economic significance to
modern society. Consequently, it is of the utmost importance to government, business, and the
public-at-large that the flow of services provided by the nation’s infrastructure continues to
operate unimpeded in the face of a broad range of natural and man-made hazards. Whenever
these facilities are damaged, disrupted, or simply unable to deliver the required services, the
results can have major negative impacts on society.
Natural hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, floods, and extreme winds can all negatively
impact on infrastructure as do accidental loss, deliberate acts of destruction, design faults,
prolonged service lives, ageing materials, and inadequate maintenance. While hazard mitiga-
tion has moved beyond purely life safety issues, the protection of lifeline infrastructures has
generally focused on designing systems to resist the loads imparted by extreme natural events.
More recently, acts such as sabotage and terrorism have begun to receive greater attention.
Modern infrastructure systems have become tightly coupled, highly sophisticated networks
that include transportation, electric power, water supply, and telecommunications systems. As
these become increasingly more complex and interconnected it becomes more difficult to
determine system boundaries.  Consequently, to achieve proper resilience, it has become
necessary to look beyond the effects of an event on just a single network system and, instead,
seek to understand the disrupted behavioural patterns of a complex, ‘systems-of-systems’.
In other words, while the failure modes of even highly complex, independent systems can
reasonably be predicted, interdependence or reliance on other systems may lead to unforeseen
consequences that can be catastrophic. Cascading failure describes the ‘domino’ effect that
arises when the inoperability or failure of a single link in any piece of infrastructure leads to the
failure of another system, and so on.
The National Science Foundation recognised the challenges surrounding Civil Infrastructure
Systems in two publications, released in the mid 1990’s: “Civil Infrastructure Systems (CIS)
Strategic Issues” NSF 94-129 and “Civil Infrastructure Systems:  An Integrative Research Pro-
gram” NSF 95-52.  The goals espoused therein included:
• Enrich the science and engineering base that can advance the understanding, assessment
and intelligent renewal of civil infrastructure systems;
• Encourage the integration, transfer, an application of knowledge that will contribute to the
intelligent renewal of the infrastructure; and
• Integrate research with education and training to produce the next generation of engineers,
scientists and others who will design, build, and use civil infrastructure systems of the
future.
The NSF initiatives recognised that system integration at all levels is necessary to achieve
these goals.  However, in spite of these initiatives, almost 10 years later, it appears that rational
and consistent application of the concepts of systems integration to infrastructure manage-
ment in a multiple risk environment have not been particularly extensive and, for the most
part, have yet to reach the mainstream of engineering practice or asset management.  It is in
this context that this Workshop and the related Resilient Infrastructure Conference were brought
together.  It also builds upon the earlier US-NZ Workshop on Civil Infrastructure Systems
Research, held in Christchurch 10th-12th October 2001.
Modern Infrastructure systems also have a critical human component that needs to be under-
stood and integrated into the management and planning for our future infrastructure needs.
The companion conference on Resilient Infrastructure that preceded this workshop reinforced
the need to define infrastructure more broadly then in the past. Likewise, the behaviour of
complex adaptive systems themselves is an emerging field of study, with much left to discover.
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In the future it will not be possible to maintain the stability of services without a common
understanding of the rules and principles which govern system interdependence and networks
inter-operability. There seems little doubt therefore that this is fertile ground for collaborative
research between engineering and the physical and social sciences.
If there is to be that paradigm shift in the way infrastructure is planned, built and managed, we
need to rethink vulnerability and sustainability, define risk choices beyond just engineering
constructs, find a common language for communicating risk and develop the new science and
metrics to explore the limits of system behaviour. Critically such an effort requires that we bring
together a diversity of skills and experiences to apply new earning concerned with risks,
vulnerabilities, resilience and decision-making.
This workshop, with its mix of participants from NZ, the USA, Europe and Australia, and broad
participation, importantly provided a unique opportunity for participants across a number of
disciplines to begin to deliver on that objective.
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2 Goals and Objectives
The main goal of the workshop was to provide an international expert forum to examine the
linkages and failure implications between infrastructure vulnerability, economic consequences
and human social impacts. In considering these linkages, the implications of cascading failure,
which requires a better understanding of the interactions among different infrastructure com-
ponents from a systems-based perspective, and the characterisation of infrastructure vulner-
ability were important considerations.
In achieving this goal, the workshop sort to examine the ‘state-of-the-art’ in the assessment of
critical infrastructure systems and identify the knowledge gaps in the understanding of critical
infrastructure interdependencies, and the implications for cascading failure. It was envisioned
that broad participation at the workshop would promote the exchange of ideas and thinking
across discipline boundaries and thereby act to catalyse co-operative research in these areas.
To accomplish the above goals, the following objectives were defined:
• Capitalise on the relationships and goodwill established with US researchers and practition-
ers, working in this area, during the US/NZ Workshop on Civil Infrastructure Systems; organ-
ised by CAE in October 2001 and jointly funded by the US National Science Foundation and
NZ Government sources.
• Provide an expert forum for identifying and comparing common problems and solutions,
and for promoting international co-operative research in all areas of critical infrastructure
systems.
• Raise the level of understanding amongst practitioners in New Zealand, US and elsewhere
of interdependencies and their influence on complex network behaviour.
• Assist in the development of strategies and methods to address issues related to the
vulnerability of critical infrastructure systems and avoiding failure.
• Bring together all the relevant disciplines, including engineering, finance, insurance and the
social sciences, from central and local government, academia, commerce and business to
address these issues.
• Produce a landmark publication on this topic, together with policy and research recommen-
dations, based on the conference, the workshop presentations and workshop discussion,
and working session outcomes.
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3 Programme and Participants
A participant list and their individual affiliations is provided in Appendix 1. A copy of the
workshop programme is attached as Appendix 2.
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This summary is prepared from notes provided by Mary Comerio. Note that abstracts of the
papers referred to have been included in this report as Appendix 3.
Workshop Objectives and Directions, - George Hooper, CAE
• Acknowledged the contributions made by the Co-Chairs of the meeting; Anne Kiermedjian
and John Mander (note that Anne Kiermedjian was unable to be present because of compli-
cations resulting from surgery).  Also welcomed visitors and acknowledged the previous
contributions arising from the 2001 Workshop on Management of Civil Infrastructure in
Multi-Hazard Environment.
Expressed the goals of the meeting from a CAE perspective as:
1 bring international learning to New Zealand
2 use New Zealand to test new ideas for the rest of the world
• This workshop focus was thus to promote collaborative research that can benefit all.
• Two themes emerged from the Resilient Infrastructure Conference in Rotorua:
1 the ideal image of strong professional collaboration in New Zealand had disappeared
somewhat with the lack of interconnection (and lack of leadership) in government,
industry, and amongst professional practitioners.
2 The Social Science presentations reinforced the need for better communication and
the need to focus on people as well as systems.
• Goals for this workshop: to create a roadmap to new knowledge and cross-disciplinary
approaches, to look for areas of collaborative working, and to find one or two projects CAE
can take forward.
Session 1: Technical Vulnerability and Disruption of Complex Systems
Building Resilience — Tom O’Rourke, Cornell University
• Emphasised the interdependence of systems, and the need to characterise system
vulnerabilities.
• Lessons from the 7/7/2005 London Terror Attack: the small tube size means that a train car
fills the tunnel with no exit-way or ventilation. If exploited, it represents a serious vulner-
ability and illustrates a key vulnerability in the system.
• Lesson from N.E. U.S. Blackout 2003: cascading failure could have been avoided by load
sharing. Inadequate awareness and maintenance issues demonstrate key vulnerabilities
and failure of institutions.
• Lessons for the Workshop:
1 Define infrastructure broadly.
2 Distinguish between natural/accidental hazards and terrorism.
3 Emphasize need to integrate institutional and organisational approaches.
4 Focus on need for information sharing protocols.
5 Explore quantitative means for characterising vulnerability and risk.
6 Recognize advanced technologies.
4 Presentation Highlights and
Workshop Notes
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Discussion Issues:
1 M. Comerio added a 7th lesson: Identify (and develop) leadership to bring government
institutions and infrastructure organisations to the table for discussion.
2 B. Phillips: Also need to pay attention to understandings that workers have of
operations.  The Shuttle disaster was a case in point.  Clearly there are multiple points
of view for  communication.
3 A. Gheorghe: Reflected that in Europe there are also cultural and language issues that
influence cross-border arrangements.  A different context from the USA.
4 A. Rose asked: Are there trade-offs between mitigation and resilience? And to what
extent can industry self-regulate; is government regulation (by policy) more effective?
5 P. May: Commented that system efficiency driven by economic rationalisation.  Does
increased resilience result in reduced ‘cost effectiveness’?
Modelling Infrastructure Security Issues — Linda Nozick, Cornell University
• Security has become a key concern in network control systems.
• Motivation is the need for a system perspective (not component only) and to look at who
pays for security.  There is always the trade-off between false positives versus probability of
detection.
• Cyber Attack and Aircraft Security examples: need to keep system effective (functioning) even
in attack mode, so use models and probabilities to optimise investments, then modify and
re-optimise. Objective function for decision making is the degree of “System Hardening”.
Discussion Issues:
Optimisation, Equity and Human Behaviour
1 How to embed ‘Markov System’ in decision-maker side to model those who are risk-
averse and those who are not.
2 How to optimise in general system-level approaches.
3 How to handle multiple objectives.
4 Equity and fairness: who pays, who gains (public vs private ownership).
5 Industrial espionage is a major contributing cause – loss of collateral value.
Protecting Critical Infrastructure Systems — Ian Buckle, University of Nevada
• The fact that things work at all is magic – understand complexity.




















• Quality of system (vertical) time (horizontal) loss in event is vulnerability (what is not lost
represents robustness). Recovery time is a measure of resilience. It is possible to reduce
vulnerability (using mitigation) or increase rate of recovery (social preparedness)?
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Discussion Issues:
1 Are there other effective ways to quantify resilience?
Is T = Q0 – Q1/r an adequate approach?
Should the “environment” (structures and processes that avoid damage) be included
in this definition?
2 Need also to bring in the concepts of business continuity.  Resilience is also about
market economics and social preparedness, i.e. resilience = f (vulnerability, rate of
recovery).
Energy Disruptions and System Availability — George Hooper, CAE
• NZ energy system is small and dependent on hydro for electricity and natural gas for its
thermal fuel supply.
• NZ has had 30 years of cheap gas, and that has underpinned NZ export industries such as
forestry and dairy. In 2002 redetermination of the gas reserves led to prices for new gas
more than doubling in 6 months.
• Low reserves-to-production ratio in natural gas supply affects all sectors, and demonstrates
the vulnerability of primary energy supply.
• NZ energy operators (gas, electric) only look at their distribution capacity, not their supply.
Because the energy industry is divided, there is no capacity to solve problems.
Discussion Issues:
1 How to transfer risk and minimize vulnerability (and increase resilience)?
2 Who should oversee the system-of-systems?
3 How do we change learning in the current settings (given the liberalisation of energy
markets and absence of centralised planning)?
4 How to recoup technical decision making capacity in the current reality of over-reliance
on market forces for decisions?
5 Does distributed generation decrease or increase resilience?
Session 2: Modelling Complexity, Uncertainty and Cascading Failures
Critical Infrastructure Issues for Socially Vulnerable Populations — Brenda Phillips,
Oklahoma State University
• Social Vulnerabilities Research since 1970’s on high risk populations in disasters, but no
adequate look at these populations in infrastructure losses.
• Healthy and resilient communities require consideration of intangible, social infrastructure
dimensions; such as economic vibrancy, appropriate housing, and equity across groups.
• Research Agenda: need to document what happens to low-wage workers, racial or ethnic
groups and special populations (e.g. disabled) in infrastructure losses.  Socio-economic
status is important.
Discussion Issues:
1 Sharing information across sectors.
2 Getting local solutions/local voices to decision makers (policy makers).
3 Documenting social, contextual, situational realities – how do specific populations
respond?
4 Evaluate performance expectations and social needs – what happens, when
connections to place, communities and livelihoods are disrupted?
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5 Evaluate what structural changes needed to move socially vulnerable populations to
the forefront of issues.
6 Evaluate how funding structure for recovery includes or dismisses social recovery
issues, i.e. EQC reinstatement of “dwellings”.
Resilience of Industrial Infrastructure to Earthquakes — Laura Steinberg, Tulane
University
• Resilience is a contextual specific quality and hard to quantify.
• Reference to Natechs: Natural Hazard Induced Technical Disasters (Bophal, Exon Valdez,
Cascading events after the 1999 Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake).
• Industry has many types of systems (components, processes, community, environment)
and many types of failures (cascading, escalating, common), but too often facilities do not
plan adequately for natural hazards.
• Two way relationships between the Industrial facility, the community, the environment, and
emergency response and lifelines. The resilience of the facility impacts the resilience of the
community and other systems.
Discussion Issues:
1 UN has done previous work on regional risk assessment, but should be updated to
include natural disasters.
2 Resilience of large industrial areas to loss of water, gas and transport is focused on
customer’s preparedness, but recovery is a dynamic time path dependent on regional
capability.
3 Robustness and resilience are words that are used differently in recovery and
definitions are needed.
4 How can triggering mechanisms be implemented to incentives improved industry
performance?
5 Can the methodology for upgrading of the nuclear industry systems (ref Manual for
Classification and Privatisation of Risks from Major Accidents in Process and Related
Industries) be used for general infrastructure systems?
6 What are the policy implications for industry – risk assessment and safety
management?
Expected Losses in Transportation Infrastructure: Perspectives on Insuring Against
Relatively Frequent Events — John Mander, University of Canterbury
• We need to communicate risk –one model is through the equation developed at PEER to
describe risk and loss. Dollars are a useful and common currency for discussion.
• Frequency of small events has high level of mean annual loss—and one is not serving users
if there is continued spending on minor repairs.
• Example of culvert failures in 100 year floods gives large damages, but should there be
investment to upgrade aged infrastructure to improve resilience (consider the impact goes
beyond the fixed asset because of co-location of other services).
• What can be done to overcome aggregate losses?
Is it possible/economic to mitigate against small, frequent losses?
Discussion Issues:
1 What is broad economic (societal) implication of changing design standards from Life-
Safety to Improved Performance for frequent events?
2 Beyond modelling of externalities, how would this be implemented in public policy?
3 What opportunities are there for collaboration?  Other connected service providers are
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generally unaware of their vulnerability.
Managing Resilience of Critical Infrastructure — P Brabhaharan, Opus Consultants
• Consulting project for New Zealand looked at risks to people within both the built and
natural environments, layering data in GIS format – where is the resilience in NZ infrastruc-
ture?
• The maintenance trap implies not looking at the long-term; focus instead on incremental
improvement?
• Multiple issues make decisions seem hard, so nothing gets done. GIS an excellent tool for
demonstrating issues to owners.
• Work demonstrates gaps in knowledge and improvements needed in performance levels.
Discussion Issues:
1 Need common data protocols and models as well as confidential repository and the
capacity to extract data.
2 Warren Centre, Australia, is establishing a project on shared data sets.  Also there is
the Australian programme Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISM).
Session 3: Social Economic and Technological Interdependencies
Downtime and Recovery — Mary Comerio, University of California, Berkeley
• Protecting institutional operations is key to resilience of social systems.
• UC Berkeley example: Structural retrofit programme enhanced by loss modelling and busi-
ness resumption planning—so that retrofit priorities re-set to limit downtime, business and
research recovery planning made part of annual preparedness planning, and non-structural
retrofits and utility upgrades added to overall programme.
• Performance goal: limit downtime to 30 days.
• How did these decisions get implemented? Culture of involvement of engineering faculty
through seismic review committee; Fear on part of new Chancellor; Money from govern-
ment; Critical data to use in decision making; and Willingness to change behaviour among
staff and faculty.
• Lessons for Workshop:
1 Create new knowledge
— develop means to illustrate key vulnerabilities
2 Create dialogue
— with input from the different sector/stakeholder groups
— define performance
3 Create ownership (leadership) to carry forward goals
— instutionalise risk management planning
— incentivise improved performance levels.
Making Resilient Organisations — Erica Dalziell, University of Canterbury
• Resilience in organisations means recovery is a process, not an event. Organisations cannot
go back to ‘what was’ but need to re-think new environment. Other opportunities arise in
process.
• Analogy: DIY in your house—the last 10% never gets done.
• Resilience is contextual, for organisations, it may not the price or volume of product pro-
duced, but instead need to go back to the mission statement of what the organisation is
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there for.  Resilient for whom?
• Lessons in looking for resilience metrics:
— Can we assess resilience independent of hazard?
— Actual indicators, or relative quantification?
— Reminder not to look too narrowly—disaster provides opportunities to accelerate the
speed and ability to change; remove boundaries, reduce likelihood that recoverable
limits will be exceeded, increase situation awareness (when environments change,
systems response needs to change).
Discussion Issues:
1 Most utility companies have a culture of rapid restoration – the maintenance cycle
again. Need to refine thinking. Recovery to what?
2 Can we borrow from concepts of sustainability?  Can we use concepts like the ‘half-
life’ of recovery?
Regional Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure — Adrian Gheorghe, ETH, Switzerland
• European context is established by the values of the European Union; borderless society
within a common framework of bilateral co-operation under national responsibility.
• To model vulnerability of Swiss infrastructure, used system-of-systems, with probability,
event tree, chaos, cellular automata, and other models. Modelling the full lifecycle of infor-
mation from ‘cradle-to-grave’.
• To view risk-vulnerability nexus, use rule based models instead of integration. Decision
Support Systems are developing a new science for critical infrastructure built upon quanti-
tative vulnerability assessment.
• Identify bottlenecks in systems, improved options, clearing-house of ideas, optimal pat-
terns and timing of recovery.  Embedded into a GIS computational platform.
• The ubiquity of digilisation is to be considered a new and revolutionary paradigm.
Discussion Issues:
1 Need to apply uncertainty techniques for the analysis of system interdependencies.
There is no ‘owner’ of critical infrastructure interfaces.
2 How to integrate and model system responses?
Tracing Infrastructure Interdependence through Economic Interdependence — Adam
Rose, Pennsylvania State University
• Interdependency is at the heart of economics.
• Exploring the use of computational general equilibrium model (CGE) to investigate
• broader interdependencies
• Total resilience extends beyond the physical infrastructure into the customers  ability to
cope with disruption (Market’s ability to ration).
• Resilience differs at the enterprise and market levels. Need to focus on key bottlenecks
and our ability to maximise society’s adaptive capacity.
• The essence of economic resilience is the innate capacity of an economic system to cushion
itself against losses or disruption of services
Discussion Issues:
1 Incorporating economic dimensions of resilience – markets have a certain resilience.
2 How to measure progress in reducing vulnerability?
3 Use of non-structural interventions.
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5 Overview of Issues
A summary of the workshop thinking as arose from the various discussion sessions, estab-
lished a number of key issues as follows:
• There are always trade-offs that need quantification and communication: mitigation vs.
resilience, the transfer of risk to minimise system vulnerability and increase resilience, how
to optimise resource allocation for multiple objectives?
• Public policy issues included: self-regulation vs. imposed regulation. Does regulation in-
crease resilience? Who should oversee the system-of-systems?
• Metrics: Are there effective ways to quantify resilience?
• How is information shared across sectors?
• What are performance expectations from society?
• What are the policy implications (and costs) of upgrading performance standards (from life
safety to a higher standard) for infrastructure?
• What are the economic implications of frequent events?
• How do we measure progress in resilience?
• How do we create modelling and data platforms that are used across systems?
• How do we create new knowledge, dialogue, and leadership in the area of critical infrastruc-
ture?
All agreed that there are critical vulnerabilities in our infrastructure: The ultimate question is
what can be done, and how do we measure progress?
It was resolved by participants to write a monograph on the topic of Critical Infrastructure
Systems.  Alternate titles suggested were: ‘A New Paradigm for Understanding Critical Infra-
structure Reliability Resilience’ and ‘Metrics for Critical Infrastructure’.
As an alternative option to a monograph it was suggested that the papers be combined into a
special issue of a journal.  Anne Kiremidjian could follow up with NSF on whether a supplement
to the workshop grant could be obtained to fund principal authors for each chapter.  The
Centre for Advanced Engineering would take responsibility for co-ordinating publication.
Basic details for the monograph were agreed as follows:
(a) Working Title: ‘Assessing Critical Infrastructure Systems’.
(b) Audience: Peer groups in risk assessment, researchers, graduate students, sophisticated
practitioners and decision makers; not the general public.
(c) Content: four to five sections each written by a team of experts with a lead author; each
section to be a state-of-the-art, stand-alone paper, and may or may not refer to other
sections; not a text book; all hazards to be addressed.
(d) Sections and authors: Suggested section topics and authors shown in table below. Addi-
tional authors need to be assigned in most areas and existing confirmed.
(e) Schedule: Annotated outline of each section by April 2006.
A preliminary list of sections and authors is given overpage.
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Erica Dalzeill, Adam Rose, Ian Buckle, Bruce
Glavovic, Barry Davidson





Mary Comerio, Brenda Phillips, George
Hooper, Eve Coles, Andrew King, Wendy
Saunders
3 Avoiding cascading failures Tom O’Rourke, Laura Steinberg, Dave
Brunsdon (ar alternate), Jason Ingham
4 Understanding and modeling
system response
Linda Nozik, John Mander, Adrian Gheorghe,
P Brabhaharan, Greg MacRae
5 Research needs / action plan All
* Note: to be formally adopted.
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Appendix 1: Participants and Affiliations
Name Organisation
United States of America
Professor Tom O’Rourke Cornell University
Professor Mary Comerio University of California, Berkeley
Professor Linda Nozick Cornell University
Laura Steinberg Tulane University
Professor Brenda Phillips Oklahoma State University
Professor Adam Rose Pennsylvania State University
Professor Ian Buckle University of Nevada
Europe
Dr Adrian Gheorghe ETH Zurich
Eve Coles Coventry University
Australia
Peter May Engineers Australia
New Zealand
Dr George Hooper CAE
Dr John Mander University of Canterbury
Dr Gregory MacRae University of Canterbury
Dr Erica Dalziell University of Canterbury
Associate Professor Bruce Glavovic Massey University
Dr Jason Ingham Auckland University
Dr Michael Pender Auckland University
Dr Barry Davidson Auckland University
Dr Daniel Whang Auckland University
Grant Kaye University of Canterbury
Andrew King GNS
John Hannah Transit New Zealand
Wendy Saunders GNS
Ruth Berry FRST
P Brabhaharan Opus International Consultants
Richard Byfield Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection
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Appendix 2: Programme
 
Wednesday August 10, 2005 
1:00  -1:30 pm   Welcome and  introductions  
  Workshop objectives:  John Mander and Tom O’Rourke 
  Directions for developing outcomes and research 
recommendations:  George Hooper 
1:30 – 4:00 pm Session One: Technical Vulnerability and Disruption of Complex 
Systems 
  1 “Protecting Critical Infrastructure Systems” by Ian Buckle, 
University of Nevada, Reno 
  2 “Modeling Security Issues” by Linda Nozick, Cornell University 
  3 “Building Resilience into Infrastructure Management” by Tom 
O’Rourke, Cornell University 
  4 “Energy disruptions and system availability”, George Hooper, 
CAE 
4:00 - 4:15 pm  Break 
4:15 – 6:00 pm  Discussion and drafting provisional recommendations 
 
Thursday August 11, 2005 
8:30 – 12:30 am  Session Two: Modeling Complexity, Uncertainty and Cascading 
Failures 
  1 "Critical Infrastructure Issues for Socially Vulnerable 
Populations:  a research assessment and agenda” by Brenda 
Phillips, Oklahoma State University. 
  2 "Resilience of Industrial Infrastructure to Earthquakes: A Study 
of Structural Damage and Cascading Events resulting from the 
Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake of 1999" by Laura Steinberg, 
Tulane University 
  3 “Expected losses in transportation infrastructure: perspectives 
on insuring against relatively frequent events” by John Mander, 
University of Canterbury. 
  4 “Managing the resilience of critical infrastructure – some 
practical considerations” by P Brabhaharan. Opus 
International Consultants 
10:15-10:30 am  Break 
10:30-12:30 pm  Discussion and drafting recommendations 
1:30 – 3:30 pm  Session Three: Social, Economic and Technological 
Interdependencies 
  1 “Downtime and Recovery: The Impact of Institutional Closure” 
by Mary Comerio, University of California, Berkeley 
  2 "Tracing Infrastructure Interdependence through Economic 
Interdependence" By Adam Rose, Pennsylvania State 
University 
  3 "Regional vulnerability of critical infrastructures and issues of 
civil defense", by Adrian Gheorghe, ETH, Switzerland. 
  4 “Making Resilient Organizations,” by Erica Dalziell 
3:30-4:30 pm  Discussion and drafting recommendations 
4:30 -5:29 pm  Working session:  Finalising draft workshop recommendations 
5.30 pm  Closure 
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Appendix 3: Abstracts of Papers
Protecting Critical Infrastructure Systems
Ian Buckle
Today, life-safety is no longer the sole requirement of successful design for extreme events but
is augmented by other performance criteria such as functionality and minimal economic loss.
This realization has led to the concept of performance-based seismic design which is a rela-
tively new development in the design and construction of civil infrastructure. Nevertheless
substantial progress has already been made in this arena, particularly with respect to the
performance of individual components of the built infrastructure, such as buildings and bridges.
But the real potential for performance-based design comes when these concepts are applied to
systems and subsystems of the infrastructure, such as transportation networks, subject to both
service load conditions and extreme events.
This paper describes current efforts to apply performance-based design to the earthquake
performance of highway networks in the United States. In recent years, a major review of
performance criteria for bridges has been undertaken and a move towards performance-based,
multi-level seismic design of bridges has begun. In a parallel exercise, a risk-based methodol-
ogy has been developed for assessing the performance of highway systems taking into ac-
count the seismic fragility of bridges and their interconnectivity, and estimating congestion and
delay times. These efforts have opened the door to performance-based seismic design of
highway systems, in which system-level performance criteria, such as maximum permissible
traffic delay times and minimum restoration times, are targeted for highway systems immedi-
ately following earthquakes of different sizes. This paper explores the feasibility of such a
design approach and potential applications for resource allocation and emergency planning.
The methodology extends to other critical infrastructure systems, such as mass transit, water
supply, telecommunications and to other extreme events, natural or man-made.
Downtime And Recovery: The Impacts Of Institutional Closure
Mary C Comerio
The design choices for new construction and retrofit of existing buildings made by the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, which is located in a high-hazard zone near the Hayward fault,
demonstrate the application of performance engineering and risk management strategies. The
University has invested  $250 million in seismic improvements.  The investment was justified
by the need to protect the safety of students, faculty, and staff, and the preservation of
research and the stature of the university.  In the 1990’s (after the Northridge and Kobe
earthquakes) life-safety specific seismic upgrading of existing buildings was the first priority,
but the focus expanded to include limiting losses among valuable contents and operational
continuity. The University used the Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Initiative together with
research at the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center to evaluate the perform-
ance of contents in modern laboratory buildings in order to develop strategies to limit down-
time in future seismic events. The research involved detailed surveys of building contents,
modelling of structural performance and shake table testing of key equipment to inform the
loss models.  The process included mapping building contents and equipment vulnerabilities
in laboratory building across the campus because the economic impacts from research down-
time are more significant than the capital losses. The research outcomes changed retrofit
priorities, informed the development of non-structural retrofit strategies and institutionalised
business and research recovery planning.
Making Organisations Resilient: Understanding the Reality of the Challenge
Erica Dalziell
Organisations play key roles within our society.  They have the responsibility for managing,
maintaining and operating our infrastructure, creating our economy, and providing employment
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and essential goods and services for our communities.  An organisation’s ability to respond
effectively to adverse events depends on their structure, the management and operational
systems they have in place, and the collective resilience of these.
New Zealand organisations have been through considerable structural change over the past
two decades.  This has occurred at all levels from central through to local government and the
private sector.  Some organisations have in fact been through several cycles of restructuring in
the pursuit of different philosophies.  This process has seen the evolution into smaller and
more independent organisations and business units.  Their focus on short-term economic
efficiency has however had a detrimental effect in terms of planning to be resilient in the face
of major emergency events.
This paper provides a past/ present/ future perspective of New Zealand by presenting reflec-
tions on the impacts of corporatisation during the 1980’s and 1990’s a view of the current
situation and suggestions on where future emphasis should be placed.  The view is expressed
that relatively few organisations (public or private) in New Zealand are currently making appro-
priate levels of commitment and investment in the vital element of ‘readiness’ or preparedness
to respond to and recover from major emergency events.  In addition to highlighting the
challenge that this situation represents, some practical strategies for increasing organisational
resilience are suggested, along with key areas where greater resource commitment should be
made.
Resilience in Infrastructure Management
T D O’Rourke
Extreme events are caused by natural hazards, severe accidents, and pre-meditated human
threats. Infrastructure resilience requires that appropriate measures are taken to assess and
reduce the potential for problems resulting from the interaction of extreme events and interde-
pendent, critical infrastructure systems. This paper identifies key characteristics of modern
infrastructure, and illustrates their influence on complex network operation by means of case
history examples associated with the 2001 World Trade Center Disaster, the 1983 New York City
Garment District Incident, and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Conclusions are drawn with
respect to the causes of damage, factors affecting the spread and constraint of damage, and
factors that contribute to both the resiliency of urban infrastructure and the attendant services
necessary to respond effectively to extreme events. Lessons learned for the managers of
infrastructure systems are summarized.
Critical Infrastructure Issues for Socially Vulnerable Populations: a research
assessment and agenda
Brenda Phillips
Over the last 20 years a steadily growing body of knowledge has accumulated on high-risk
populations in disaster situations. Socially vulnerable populations typically include those ex-
periencing higher rates of death and injury:  (e.g.) women, children, the elderly, persons with
disabilities, poor households, and racial and ethnic minorities.  Attempting to assess the
situations of such a diverse set of vulnerable persons vis-à-vis critical infrastructure is made
difficult by a startling lack of scientific studies.  To start, this presentation examines available
literature for clues to critical infrastructure issues.  The author then outlines ways in which
critical infrastructure losses might generate unique issues for high-risk populations.
In particular, the author calls for a hearty multi-disciplinary research agenda to address the
needs of the socially vulnerable when faced with critical infrastructure threats and losses.  The
author will present a number of items including:
• Theoretical advancements necessary for conducting such research.
• Methods appropriate to such work, including those that incorporate the perspectives of
those at high-risk.
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• Population specific research, e.g., experiences of the deaf during telecommunications losses.
• The ways in which social vulnerabilities overlap and intersect, heightening risk during
infrastructure failures.
The paper concludes with a set of practical strategies for addressing critical infrastructure
issues among socially vulnerable populations:
• Funders should require multi-disciplinary research that incorporates meaningfully the broader
social impacts so crucial to those at higher-risk.
• All national and state task forces or commissions on high-risk populations must include
social vulnerability experts and those at high-risk as active members.
• Conferences, workshops and symposia must include sessions, plenaries and published
proceedings that address high-risk populations.
• Professional organizations, universities and researchers must involve those at high-risk,
and their advocacy organizations, as participants in the research process and as active
interpreters of the research findings.
Tracing Infrastructure Interdependence through Economic  Interdependence
Adam Rose
Interdependence is at the heart of the economic system.  No single producer or consumer is
self-sufficient, but rather depends on others.  Moreover, this interdependence is not limited to
immediate trading partners of a given business enterprise, but also extends to the successive
chain of “upstream” suppliers and “downstream” customers.  Thus, every sector of the economy
is connected directly or indirectly.
Some inputs are more critical than others in terms of their role in the economy.  Infrastructure
is at the foundation of the economic pyramid, in that it serves all sectors and because ready
substitutes do usually not exist.  Infrastructure, however, is not monolithic.  Various types
(electric, gas and water utilities, communication and highway networks) are interdependent as
well.
Economists have developed two major types of models to analyse the interconnectedness of
economic activity in general and infrastructure in particular.  The first is input-output (I-O)
analysis, which was devised many years ago by Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, and which has
long been the most frequently used tool of economic impact analysis, capturing not just direct
interaction but multiplier effects of indirect interaction among infrastructure components them-
selves and with respect to the rest of the economy (see, e.g., Rose and Miernyk, 1989; Brookshire
et al., 1997).  Unfortunately, I-O has many limitations, including linearity and lack of behav-
ioural content.
More recently, computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis has been developed, incorporat-
ing the best features of I-O but allowing for the inclusion of nonlinearities and behavioural
responses to market price signals and resource availabilities under normal and crisis situations
(see Shoven and Whalley, 1992; Rose, 1995).  Many of these responses correspond to several
types of resilience adjustments (e.g., input substitution, conservation) (Rose and Liao, 2005).
This more flexible approach has enabled researchers to more accurately assess infrastructure
interdependence, improve disaster loss estimation, measure resilience, and identify options
that can most cost-effectively reduce losses (Rose, 2005).
This paper will summarize how these two economic modelling approaches are applied to
infrastructure interdependence and resilience.  Examples will be provided of how research by
engineers on infrastructure network fragility can be used in conjunction with GIS to provide a
spatial dimension to these economic models, in order to sharpen their abilities to address
important questions (see, e.g., O’Rourke et al., 2003; Shinozuka and Chang, 2004).  It will
provide a summary of recent applications and what we have learned from them.  The presen-
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tation will conclude with a discussion of conceptual and empirical issues confronting econo-
mists and engineers to improve this important modelling capability.
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